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Abstract 
In many countries welfare services that traditionally have been provided by the public 
sector are increasingly being contracted out to private providers. But are private 
contractors better at providing these services? We use a randomized experiment to 
empirically assess the effectiveness of contacting out employment services to private 
placement agencies. Our results show that unemployed at private placement agencies 
have a much closer interaction with their placement worker than unemployed at the 
Public Employment Service (PES). In particular, unemployed at private agencies 
receive more assistance in improving their job search technology. We do not find any 
overall difference in the probability of employment between private placement agencies 
and the PES), but this hides important heterogeneities across different types of 
unemployed. We find evidence that private providers are better at providing em-
ployment services to immigrants, and also indications that they may be worse for 
adolescents. Any effects tend to fade away over time. 
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 1 Introduction 
Are private contractors better at providing welfare services than are public providers? In 
many OECD countries welfare services (schools, health care, social assistance, and 
employment services) that traditionally have been provided by the public sector are 
increasingly being contracted out to private providers. The motivation for contracting 
out is that private entrepreneurs—having residual rights of the asset—have stronger 
incentives to invest in cost saving technologies and quality improving innovations, as 
discussed in the framework of Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and 
Hart (1995). But private contractors may have too strong incentives to reduce costs, 
which can impair on the quality of the services provided (Shleifer 1998, Hart, Shleifer 
and Vishney 1997). Specifically, the scope for private provision is larger if oppor-
tunities to save costs by deteriorating non-contractible quality are limited; if innovations 
are a salient feature of the industry; and if there is a substantial reputation building and 
competition among producers that force them to uphold quality.  
A contrasting line of arguments suggest that many public sector activities can be 
viewed as mission-oriented where employees are highly motivated and subscribing to 
the mission; it may thus be less costly to provide incentives in the public domain (see 
Besley and Ghatak 2005). All in all, the ex-ante case for contracting out thus differ 
across services and have to be assessed empirically ex-post. 
In this paper we empirically assess the case for contacting out job placement. Even if 
private placement services are present in many countries
1, evidence of its effectiveness 
is still scarce. Winterhager (2006) and Bernard and Wolff (2008) find small negative, or 
no, general effects of contracting out placement services to private providers in 
Germany, whereas Winterhager, Heinze and Spermann (2006) find positive effects for 
individuals utilizing job placement vouchers at private placement agencies in Germany. 
Evaluations of the British Employment zones indicate positive effects from contracting 
out reintegration services for long-term unemployed in certain deprived areas (Hasluck, 
Elias and Green 2003). A potential worry in these observational studies is that there 
                                                 
1 Australia and the Netherlands have gone as far as privatizing employment services, while private placement 
agencies provide services alongside the PES in Britain, Germany and Denmark (See for example Struyven and Steurs 
2005; Bruttel 2005; Jahn and Ochel 2007; Bredgaard and Larsen 2007; Finn 2008; and Wright 2008). 
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services. 
We add to existing research by using experimental data to estimate if private 
providers are more efficient at placing unemployed; if private providers use different 
technologies; and if private providers generate a higher satisfaction among their clients. 
By providing empirical evidence in a setting with strong incentive based contracts 
and a well defined service, where the extent of non-contractible quality is limited; where 
there is a substantial competition for contracts; and where performance may have 
consequences for future procurement, we also contribute to the more general discussion 
on when a government should provide a service in-house and when it should contract 
out provision (See for example Dewenter and Malatesta 2001, Duggan 2004 and Aizer, 
Currie and Moretti 2007, Lindqvist 2008 and Bloom et al 2006 for work on private 
versus public in other settings) 
In 2007 the Swedish centre-right government gave the Public Employment Service 
(PES) instructions to more actively use private contractors as an alternative to in-house 
provision (Regeringen 2007). As a result the PES, in July 2007, launched a scheme 
where private contractors were commissioned to match hard-to-place unemployed to 
jobs on the regular labor market. Target groups were immigrants, adolescents and 
disabled, and the trial ran for 3 or 6 months.
2 The trial was setup as an experimental 
intervention where we randomly assigned almost 5,000 unemployed to either a private 
placement agency or to the PES. Specifically, those assigned to a private placement 
agency were given an option to switch from the PES to the private provider during the 
trial period. The contracted private placement agencies faced high-powered incentives 
as they were remunerated largely based on successful placements (60 percent of the full 
payment), as compared with no similar financial motivation for the PES. Even if the 
PES are benchmarked internally based on certain indicators (e.g. placement rates and 
customer satisfaction) their incentives are arguably weaker. 
Our results indicate that unemployed at private placement agencies have a much 
closer interaction and are more content with their placement worker than are the 
                                                 
2 The intervention was 6 months for disabled and foreign born individuals and 3 months for adolescents. 
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assistance in improving their job search technology. We do not find any overall 
difference in the probability of employment between private placement agencies and the 
PES. Our results show that private providers are better at providing employment 
services to immigrants; in fact, immigrants get significantly higher wage earnings up to 
12 months after randomization. There are also indications that private contractors are 
worse at providing such services to adolescents. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we describe the 
institutional setting of the trial with private placement services and give a brief back-
ground to employment services on the Swedish labor market. Section three describes 
the experimental design for allocating individuals to private providers and our esti-
mation strategies. Section four present the results and section five concludes. 
2 Institutional  setting 
2.1  Job placement in Sweden 
The PES in Sweden plays a central role for Swedish labor market policy. In addition to 
matching jobseekers and employers and general labor market counseling to jobseekers, 
case workers also assigns unemployed to labor market programs and administer labor 
market related rehabilitation for those with reduced work capacity (e.g. disabled). The 
PES also plays an important role for the control function in the unemployment 
insurance by monitoring that claimants fulfill the requirements in the insurance of 
actively searching for jobs. This control function gives the PES some leverage towards 
the unemployed to be active in their job search, and to accept program assignments and 
job offers (Sibbmark 2008). 
The role for private providers in implementing Swedish labor market policy has 
traditionally been limited, and restricted to labor market training where private provid-
ers have been used since the late 1980’s (Olofsson and Wadensjö, 2009 p57). In fact, 
the PES had a monopoly on employment services on the Swedish labor market until 
1992 when commercial temping and recruiting agencies were allowed to operate. These 
commercial agencies are still regulated and, for example, not allowed to charge 
jobseekers for matching services. 
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In 2007, the centre-right government gave the PES instructions to more actively use 
private contractors to place unemployed in order to improve the matching between job 
seekers and employers (Regeringen 2007). The idea was that private placement agencies 
could utilize improved technologies and offer more personalized services. As a 
consequence of this instruction the PES launched a trial scheme with private placement 
agencies in July 2007. Within the trial, the covered target groups were randomly 
assigned either to a private placement agency, to fill contracted slots, or to the PES (in 
section 3.1 we describe the random assignment in more detail).  
Commission 
In Early 2007, the PES posted a call for tenders to procure placement services from 
private contractors. The procurement included contracts in three different regional labor 
markets (Malmö metropolitan area, Norrköping and Sundsvall/Timrå/Härnösand) for 
three specific target groups with difficulties to reintegrate into the labor market. The 
groups covered by the procurement were:  
1  Disabled with impaired working capacity. 
2  Immigrants with an unemployment spell of at least six months (excluding 
individuals under age 25); and  
3  Adolescents under 25 years with an unemployment spell of at least three 
months;  
The call for tender encompassed placement services for matchable individuals during a 
period of six months for disabled and immigrants, and three months for adolescents. 
The individuals covered by the procurement were matchable in that they had 
professions, educations and experience that were in demand on the labor market. That 
is, they were assessed not to be in need of any labor market program to find employ-
ment. Individuals in these groups were thus judged to be ready for the labor market, but 
suffering from difficulties in marketing their skill profiles. 
In the procurement, commissioned private placement agencies were contracted to 
find the assigned job seekers a full-time employment—or employment to the assessed 
level of work capacity for disabled—on the regular labor market with a duration of at 
least three months. The private providers were essentially allowed to choose their own 
6  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: technology to place the unemployed, but did not get paid for hiring them in-house and 
operating as a temping firm. Also, unemployed assigned to private placement agencies 
did not have access to the set of regular labor market programs during the contracted 
period.
3 Contractors could not refuse anyone assigned to them, so there was no room for 
contractors to cherry pick easy cases. 
The contracted providers also took over parts of the control function in the 
unemployment insurance from the PES; that is, if an individual did not fulfill the 
requirements in the insurance of being actively searching for jobs, the provider had to 
report this violation to the PES who would then initiate sanctions in the unemployment 
insurance. In this respect, the private providers had the same type of leverage towards 
the unemployed as the PES. 
Assignment of contracted slots 
Unemployed covered by the procurement were randomly allocated to the contracted 
private placement agencies in six waves: starting on July 10, 2007, and with the last 
wave in January 28, 2008. This means that the unemployed in the last wave were ser-
viced by private placement agencies until July 2008, had they not yet transited into 
employment. As this trial scheme was cast in the second half 2007, with fairly low 
unemployment, it turned out to be difficult to fill the procured slots. Starting with the 
second wave of assignment (August 15, 2007) the required length of the unemployment 
spell for adolescents and foreign born was therefore reduced to 30 days.
4  
In total 669 unemployed individuals—within the three target groups—were allocated 
to a private placement agency. Table 1 describes how individuals are allocated across 
the regional trial sites and across target groups. Adolescents are the largest group with 
                                                 
3 There are some exceptions to this: Disabled could make use of programs involving technical aids and personal 
assistance at the workplace if the private provider and the PES agreed on this (Stöd till hjälpmedel på arbetsplatsen, 
Stöd till personligt biträde på arbetsplatsen); All groups could get a certain wage subsidy if they were eligible to this 
program (Nystartsjobb); Individuals for whom the unemployment insurance was exhausted were transferred into a 
different benefit scheme (Jobb- och utvecklingsgarantin). 
4 In the last wave of assignment on January 28, 2008, the required length of unemployment spell in order to be 
covered was raised to 50 days 
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assigned to immigrants and disabled, respectively.
5  
Table 1. Recruitment to private placement by site and target group 
  Regional trial sites     
 Malmö  Norrköping  Sundsvall  Total 
Adolescents  102 113 128 343 
Immigrants   67  139  206 
Disabled   49  71  120 
Total  102 229 338 669 
 
Competition for contracts 
At each regional site two competing providers were procured for each contracted target 
group. The procurement procedure encompassed to stages. In the first stage, bidders had 
to document their proficiency (e.g. their experience from similar assignments and the 
competence of their personnel) and firms fulfilling certain quality criteria were invited 
to submit a full tender. In the second stage, the tender had to include a detailed 
description of working methods as well as a price. The quality of firms submitting the 
full tender was then rated according to the general quality of their working methods; 
their focus towards employers; time interacting with job seekers; and their degree of 
innovation. The bids were finally selected on both quality (60 percent) and the price (40 
percent). 
In the first round 38 firms submitted bids, of which eight to ten (depending on target 
group) were invited to submit a full tender. This two stage procedure was constructed in 
order to ensure a substantial degree of competition both along the dimensions of price 
and quality. 
The providers awarded a contract did not have any prior experience in the exact 
services procured, since these were previously provided by the PES. Still, the awarded 
firms did have experience in job placement services, reintegration services, re-
habilitation, and labor market training; for example provided at large lay-offs, firm 
closures or for individuals being on long-term sick leave as covered by—and financed 
                                                 
5 The reason for the large share of adolescents is that the procurement for disabled and immigrants in Malmö was 
appealed by a firm not receiving any contract, and subsequently withdrawn from the procurement by the PES. 
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of the groups covered by the procurement may, however, have been limited. 
Incentives from contracts 
The private placement agencies were remunerated largely based on successful place-
ments. The contracts stated a price per unemployed which was decided through the 
procurement; this price differed both across target groups and across providers.
6 The 
contractors were paid 40 percent of this sum when an unemployed got assigned to them; 
30 percent was payable when the unemployed had signed an employment contract for 
full time employment with a duration of at least three months and had started the 
employment; and the last 30 percent was payable when the job seeker had stayed at his 
employment for three months. 
While the private contractors faced strong economic incentives to find successful 
matches, the PES did not meet such financial incentives. Still, each branch of the PES is 
benchmarked based on a number of key indicators, including measures of customer 
satisfaction (both jobseekers and employers); measures of placement rates; indicators of 
wellbeing among personnel; and budgetary indicators. Although the PES is bench-
marked internally their incentives are arguably weaker than those of the private 
providers. 
A general worry when contracting out services is that the incentives faced by the 
agent—as induced by the contract—does not correspond to the intentions of the 
principal. However, in the present setting the contracted outcome—full-time employ-
ment on the regular labor market with a duration of at least three months—is well 
defined (observable and verifiable) and encapsulates many aspects of quality. Hence, 
even if there are additional aspects of the service such as the quality of the match, there 
is a limited scope for providers to reduce costs in a way that deteriorates the quality of 
the service. 
The trial with private placement agencies in 2007 was the first episode of 
competition in employment services in Sweden. Even if this particular trial was in itself 
                                                 
6 For disabled/Adolescents/Immigrants the contracted price ranges between 30,000/12,200/20,280 SEK and 
42,000/25,000/35,000 SEK. 
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privatization of employment services. In fact, the centre-right government expressed a 
political will when instructing the PES in 2007 to more actively use private entre-
preneurs when providing employment services (Regeringen 2007).
7 The trial scheme 
could therefore be seen as a storefront, and thereby giving the contractors additional 
incentives to provide high quality and efficient services in the hope of being awarded 
future contracts. Now, the trial may also have given the PES incentives to prove their 
efficiency, when facing the treat of a larger scale contracting out of their services.  
2.3  What is the treatment? 
Even if our evaluation will capture the net impact the receiving placement services from 
a private agency, as compared to the PES, it can be instructive to consider what compo-
nents this net effect consists of. 
First of all, there could be an effect from changing from a public to a private 
provider, since ownership in itself can provide motivation.
8 A related issue is that 
private and public providers within this trial scheme have different incentives; where 
private placement agencies face substantial financial incentives. It can be conceptually 
difficult to separate the effects of ownership from those of monetary incentives induced 
by contracts. An additional incentive effect may also come from private providers 
hoping to be awarded additional contracts in future procurement. 
The procedure with a two stage procurement process, ensuring competition both in 
quality and price, can also have an effect on outcomes. As noted by Winterhager (2006), 
if the first stage in a procurement is used to screen for a minimum level of quality, and 
tenders in the second stage are only selected on the lowest price, there is a considerable 
risk that firms awarded commission are those that combine a low price with low 
quality.
9 This was, indeed, not the case in the present setting as both quality and price 
                                                 
7 The instructions to the PES in 2008 (Regeringen 2008) expressed an even clearer political will by requiring the PES 
to use private providers as an integral part of its operations, and by setting up ambitious quantitative goals on the 
market penetration of private placement agencies. 
8 In the framework of Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) this motivation comes 
from private providers having residual control rights of the asset. 
9 Winterhager (2006) argues that in the German setting with private job placement services he is studying, providers 
with low quality and price were awarded contracts. 
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types of providers may have been awarded contracts. 
We will also capture differences that are due to the fact the PES have a long 
experience in reintegrating these particular groups of unemployed, whereas the private 
contractors have less experience in traditional job placement services. It worth noting, 
however, that private contractors do have experience in providing similar services, 
albeit in other contexts and to different groups of unemployed. 
All in all, the estimated treatment effects will capture all technology differences 
between public and private providers generated by these differences in ownership, 
incentives, procurement procedure and experience. 
3 Empirical  strategy 
To assess the effects of private placement services we utilize a randomized experiment. 
In this section we describe the experiment, the data collection and the econometric 
strategy used to estimate the effectiveness of private provision. 
3.1 Experimental  design 
The problem when assessing the effect of an intervention is that individuals who are 
being assigned to, orself-selecting into, a program may be different from those not 
affected by the intervention; e.g. by having a different capacity to benefit from the 
program or having different general prospects on the labor market. Importantly, they are 
typically different in dimensions that are unobservable to the researcher. The ideal way 
to identify the effects of an intervention is to utilize an experimental approach where the 
random assignment balances individual characteristics across those treated and non-
treated.  
The introduction of the trial scheme with private placement service gave us an 
opportunity to set up an experiment—together with the central administration of the 
PES—in order to evaluate the effectiveness of contracting out placement services. In the 
experimental intervention, unemployed were randomized into an experimental group 
and a control group; those assigned to the experimental group were then given a choice 
to switch from the PES to a private placement agency. 
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The experiment was staged in six experimental waves: starting on July 10, 2007, and 
with the last wave in January 28, 2008. At each of the six experimental waves, the indi-
viduals in the stock of unemployed—within the target groups at each regional site—
were either randomized to a specific private provider, or to the control group at the PES.
 
The experimental variation generated is thus within each target group-region-wave 
cluster; in total we have 33 sub experiments to be used in the analysis.
10 
The number of individuals subjected to the randomization at each wave was 
determined by the available stock of unemployed within each target group (at each 
regional site) and the number available slots at the private placement agencies.
11 Those 
unemployed who were subjected to randomization in a specific wave (either assigned as 
controls or to the experimental group) did not belong to the sampling frame in 
subsequent waves. In total, the experimental intervention include 4,804 individuals, of 
whom 2,410 were randomized to the experimental group. 
Table 2 shows how individuals subjected to the intervention are distributed across 
regional sites, targets groups, as well as the relative size of the experimental waves. The 
largest regional trial site was Norrköping followed by Sundsvall/Timrå/Härnösand and 
Malmö, and the largest target group in the randomization was adolescents. The 
experiment was initiated in July 2007, but the second wave in August 2007 was largest, 
essentially sampling the whole stock of available unemployed—52 percent of the 
individuals included in the experiment. During the fall 2007 and early 2008 four 
additional randomizations took place to fill the remainder of the procured slots. 
                                                 
10 Note that the randomization did not cover all target groups at all regional sites for all six waves of the experiment. 
11 It should be noted that local caseworkers at the PES had no opportunity to manipulate who got assigned to the 
private providers. The randomization of individuals was carried out by the central administration of the PES at each 
wave of the experiment, and was based on random numbers generated from birth dates which were provided by us. 
After each randomization the central administration of the PES contacted the local branch and gave the list on whom 
to call for information meetings. 
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Table 2. Sample description 
  Experimental group  Control group 
Regional trial sites    
Malmö 0.251  0.249 
Sundsvall 0.293  0.294 
Norrköping 0.456  0.457 
Target group 
1.000 1.000 
Adolescents 0.606  0.606 
Immigrants 0.266  0.267 
Disabled 0.128  0.127 
Experimental wave 
1.000 1.000 
July 10, 2007  0.103  0.104 
August 15, 2007  0.515  0.518 
September 17, 2007  0.077  0.078 
October 15, 2007  0.192  0.191 
November 26, 2007  0.038  0.038 
January 28, 2008  0.075  0.072 
  1.000 1.000 
Observations 2,410  2,394 
 
After each randomization all individuals assigned to the experimental group were 
contacted by postal mail, where they were informed that they had an opportunity to 
switch to a private placement agency. In the letter they were also called to an 
information meeting at the PES (sometimes the meeting was located at the private 
placement agency). At this meeting the PES gave general information about the trial 
scheme; including rules and rights, and the private provider informed about their 
philosophy and working methods.  
At the end of the meeting individuals had to decide on whether to take the 
opportunity to switch from the PES and instead receive job placement services from the 
private provider for a period of 6 months (3 months for adolescents). Participation in the 
trial was voluntary, but individuals declining the offer had to state a reason. Those who 
took the option could however not discontinue their participation during the 6 (3) month 
intervention, and private providers could not refuse anyone assigned to them. 
Outcome of the randomization 
To check if our random assignment was successful in balancing the experimental and 
control group, we compare them with respect to an array of observable and pre-
determined background characteristics; see Table 3. We find that the experimental and 
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length of their unemployment spell; they are on average around 29 years with three and 
a half months of unemployment, and only a quarter are long-term unemployed. Long-
term unemployment is defined as 3 months for those less than 25 year of age and as 6 
months for those at, or over, 25. In both groups 39 percent carry benefits from the 
unemployment insurance, and they have similar job search profiles with respect to full-
time work and geographical search areas. The groups are also similar with respect to 
educational attainment; around 62 percent have high school education, while only 12 to 
13 percent carry a university degree. Turning to income the year before the intervention, 
we find that the share with a zero income is similar in the experimental and control 
groups, but the pre-study income is 4,700 SEK higher in the experimental group.  
Even if the income difference is significant, the overall picture is that the experi-
mental intervention has generated a good balance between the groups. In the analysis 
we will also control for all these background characteristics. It should be noted, 
however, that the level of pre-study income is not significant when included as a control 
in the analysis (see column 4 in Table A2 in the Appendix) 
Table 3. Balance of the experiment  
  Experimental group  Control group  Difference 
Male 0.520  0.533  -0.013 
Age 29.1  29.1  0.000 
Unemployed (months)  3.5  3.6  -0.100 
Long term unemployed  0.254  0.258  -0.004 
Education compulsory  0.241  0.257  -0.016 
Education upper sec  0.626  0.623  0.003 
Education University  0.133  0.120  0.013 
Pre-study income  49135  44290  4845** 
Pre-study income>0  0.649  0.658  -0.009 
Non-Nordic citizen  0.133  0.133  0.000 
Unemployment insurance  0.393  0.386  0.007 
Searching full time employment  0.961  0.960  0.001 
Extended search area  0.380  0.370  0.010 
Observations 2410  2394   
 
Compliance 
The compliance in the experiment turned out to be relatively low; only 28 of those 
randomized to the experimental group chose to switch from the PES to a private 
placement agency. As seen in Table 4 the low compliance rate is the result of a selection 
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information meeting actually attended the meeting (51 percent), and amongst those 
present only about a half took the opportunity to switch to a private provider (54 
percent). 
The low attendance at the meetings may in part be due to the PES’s unemployment 
register not being fully updated for all individuals who have recently left 
unemployment,
12 and in part due to a relatively low share of unemployed being eligible 
for benifits from the unemployment insurance in the target groups. Individuals on 
unemployment insurance could get sanctions in their unemployment benefits for not 
attending the meeting, but as only 39 percent of the individuals in the experiment 
received unemployment benifits this leverage was only partially binding. This is 
particularly true for adolescents—where only 23 percent are covered by the unemploy-
ment insurance—who had the lowest attendance at the information meeting.  
Of individuals attending the meeting, adolescents were most inclined to participate 
(58 percent) whereas immigrants were most likely to decline the opportunity. In the 
control group, on the other hand, compliance was 100 percent. 
Table 4. Compliance in the experimental group 
  Experimental group  Attended meeting  Participated 
Adolescents  1460  587 (0.40)  343 (0.39) 
Immigrants   642  424 (0.66)  206 (0.32) 
Disabled   308  223 (0.72)  120 (0.23) 
Total  2410  1234 (0.51)  669 (0.28) 
 
The compliers did not fully represent the population of the target groups. Older 
individuals and individuals with a longer unemployment spell are more likely to take 
the opportunity to switch from the PES to a private job placement agency, and so are 
also women. All in all, we do not find any strong selection on observable characteristics 
into treatment among those randomized into the experimental group (See the first stage 
regressions in Table A2 column 2 in the Appendix). 
                                                 
12 For a discussion on misclassification in Swedish unemployment registers see Bring and Carling (2000) and 
Bennmarker et al. (2000). 
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Our analysis is based on a combination of four different sources of data: administrative 
data from the PES, billing data from the private providers; earnings data from the tax 
authorities and data from two surveys. 
For each wave of the experiment we first collect information from the PES’s 
unemployment register, at the time of the randomization, for all individuals subjected to 
the randomization. This includes information on region; target group; whether the 
individual is a control or belongs to the experimental group; as well as the background 
characteristics described in Table 3 (above). In addition, we have collected information 
on participation in the trial scheme—i.e. whether the individual switched to a private 
provider—directly from the billing of the assignment fee. We expect this billing data to 
be of high quality and exhaustive as the private providers have strong incentives to 
make sure they receive their payments. 
We use two different data sources for outcomes; both survey information and also 
wage income data that employers are mandated to report to the tax authorities.
13 
Specifically, employers have to report the annual wage sum paid to each employee, and 
the months for which the wage is paid for income tax declaration purposes. For every 
individual in the experiment we have thus been able to collect yearly wage earnings 
2006 to 2008 paid by each employer, and in addition the first and last month every year 
that the employer pays wage to the individual. Using this information we calculate an 
average monthly wage for each individual, as well as an employment indicator month-
by-month.
14 
We have also administered two surveys to the individuals included in the experi-
ment.
15 The first survey was collected either one or three months after individuals were 
                                                 
13 We do not use information on employment status from the PES’s unemployment register. The reason is that we do 
not trust the unemployment register for outcomes in the (post) intervention period since private providers have much 
stronger incentives to report employment (than have the PES). 
14 The employment indicator is defined as having a monthly wage earning larger than 5,000 SEK. We have used a 
cut-off larger than zero in order to reduce noise caused by for example delayed holiday payments or over time 
compensation.  
15 For the first survey there was an administrative error making it impossible for us to link some survey responses to 
individuals in the experiment; the same survey identification number was used twice, to an individual in the 
experimental group and to a control. Fortunately the error was random, but it effectively reduced the response rate to 
60 percent. 
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16 The first survey is mainly focused at intermediate 
outcomes capturing differences in working methods, also collects information on short 
run employment outcomes.  
The second survey was administered three months after the longest potential treat-
ment at a private placement agency; which means nine (six) months after randomization 
for immigrants and disabled (adolescents). This survey collects information on 
employment outcomes and general life satisfaction. 
The response rate is over 60 percent in the first survey and over 70 percent in the 
second, with the same response rate in both the experimental and the control groups. 
Similarly we do not find any systematic differences in observable characteristics 
between responders in the experimental and the control groups. Descriptive statistics of 
all outcome variables are available in Table A1 in the Appendix 
3.3 Estimation  method 
In the experiment, compliance to treatment was voluntary for individuals who were 
randomized into the experimental group; that is, some unemployed individuals were 
randomly given an offer to switch from the PES to a private provider. Any differences 
in outcomes between the experimental group and the control group therefore reflect the 
intention-to-treat effect. (Table A1 in the Appendix displays the unconditional intention-
to-treat effects.) 
To estimate the treatment effects of receiving job placement services from a private 
contractor (rather that the intention-to-treat effect of being offered such services) we use 
the random assignment as an instrument for going to a private provider. In essence, we 
scale the reduced form estimates of being offered private placement services with the 
share of unemployed who accepted the offer (compliers). Our identifying assumptions  
are that the random assignment of offers is really random and that there is no direct 
effect of being offered treatment on the outcome, other than through its effect on the 
probability to take the treatment; i.e. that the assignment is ignorable and monotonic 
(see for example Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996).  
                                                 
16 Adolescents are surveyed after one month, whereas half of the immigrants and disabled were randomly surveyed 
after one and three months respectively. To increase power in our analysis we have disregarded the timing of the first 
survey and use the information as composite measures of the first part of the intervention period. 
IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services:  17 That the treatment offers were really randomly assigned is indicated in Table 3 
showing the balance of the experiment
17, whereas the strength of the instrument is 
indicated by the fact that the compliance is 28 percent in the experimental group and 
100 percent in the control group (See also the first stage regressions in Table A2 column 
2 in the Appendix). Since no-one in the control group received treatment, the 
monotonicity assumption, i.e. that no-one counter act their assignment, is fulfilled. 
We therefore estimate the following IV-model capturing the treatment effect of 
private placement services, for unemployed choosing to switch a private job placement 
agency when given the opportunity, 
, ij j ij ij
ij j ij ij
e Z Private
Private Y
+ + + + =
+ + + + =
λ φ α






where Yij is the outcome of individual i in sub-experiment j in the outcome equation. 
Privateij is the indicator of being treated by private placement agencies, which is 
endogenous due to non-compliance. In order to ensure balance among treated and non-
treated we instrument treatment status with the initial random assignment of the option 
of getting treatment, Zij. To further ensure balance and to reduce residual variance we 
control for a vector, Xij, of background characteristics described in Table 3.
18 For 
similar reasons we also utilize the within sub-experiment variation by including fixed 
effects, λj, for each region-target group-wave cluster j.
19 Hence, δ captures the effect of 
                                                 
 
17 A pssible concern is that sanctions in the unemployment insurance for those not attending the information meeting 
could have had direct effects on the outcome. First, with only 39 percent of the unemployed in the target groups 
having qualified for unemployment insurance, the threat of sanctions were only partially binding. Second, only 2-3 
percent of the claimants received sanctions in the unemployment insurance during the 2007-2008 period 
(Riksrevisionen, 2009).Therefore we do not believe potential sanctions to have had any direct effects on 
unemployment. 
18 Column 4 of Table A2 in the Appendix display employment effects of private placement services 6/9 months after 
randomization with, and without, a vector, Xij, of background characteristics. The estimated effect becomes slightly 
larger in size, but is essentially the same, when including the covariates. 
19 In the econometric specifications we use 39 fixed effects, rather than 33 as in the number of sub-experiments. The 
reason for this is that from the second wave of the experiment the requirement on the length of the unemployment 
spell to be included in the sampling frame was reduced. This had the consequence that some individuals who were 
not in the sampling frame in the first wave of the randomization were randomized in the later waves. In the 
randomization procedure used by PES everyone with random numbers below a certain threshold were allocated to the 
experimental group, and everyone above to the control group, but with problems in filling the contracted slots this 
threshold number was increased. From the second wave of the experiment, individuals subject to randomization 
consisted of both newly unemployed individuals with short unemployment spells flowing into the target groups and 
individuals with longer unemployment spells who were unemployed at an earlier wave of the randomization but not 
within the sampling frame at that point. As a consequence of the changed threshold number in the randomization, 
individuals with longer unemployment spells were overrepresented in the experimental group. In order to handle this 
18  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: private placement services for individuals choosing to participate when being randomly 
assigned an offer. 
Benefits of experimental variation 
The benefits of using an experimental approach—rather than relying on selection on 
observables—can be appreciated from Table A2 in the Appendix. Here we assess the 
effects of private placement services on having employment 6/9 months after random-
ization (3 months after the end of the intervention). Looking first at the OLS estimates 
in column 1 (lower panel), where we compare unemployed who are under treatment at 
private placement agencies with all those at the PES—the control group plus the non-
compliers—and controlling for a rich set of covariates, Xij, we find a positive and 
significant estimate. This would indicate that being under treatment at a private job 
placement agency increases the probability of having a job 6/9 months after 
randomization with 4.5 percentage points. Comparing the lower panel estimates where 
we control for Xij with the upper panel without covariates, we see that the point 
estimate is slightly reduced but stay essentially the same, thus indicating that selection 
on observables to private providers would not be a problem. Still we see from the first-
stage estimates of the IV (column 2 of Table A2) that individuals selecting to go to 
private providers are in fact not fully representative.  
When we instead exploit the experimental variation to identify the effect of private 
employment services, we find negative and insignificant effects (See the IV-estimates in 
column 4). In our setting with full compliance in the control group, both the IV-estimate 
and the OLS-estimate should be equivalent to the average effect of treatment on the 
treated (Angrist and Imbens 1992).] Hence, the benefits of our identification strategy are 
obvious; had we tried to identify effects by conditioning on observables (e.g. a matching 
approach) instead of running an experiment, we would have risked drawing erroneous 
conclusions about the effectiveness of private employment services.  
                                                                                                                                               
problem we have defined separate experiments (clusters) for individuals being “stock” and “flow” sampled from the 
second wave of the randomization and onwards. 
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The motivation for contracting out job placement services to private providers is that 
private providers may prove more effective in matching unemployed to vacancies. 
These benefits may emanate from private contractors having an opportunity to be more 
flexible in methods; not having to adhere to regularities in the routines of the PES, or 
from them having different skill sets stemming from other types of experiences. In 
addition, they may also have stronger innate incentives to innovate the market, being 
claimants of residual profits. 
In this section we will first analyze differences in the technology of delivering jobs to 
unemployed. That is, using survey information—collected one or three months after 
randomization—we describe differences between private job placement agencies and 
the PES in how the unemployed spend their time, how they search for jobs and how 
they interact with their case worker. 
We will also present estimates on the effects of private placement services on various 
labour market outcomes and on personal well-being. 
4.1  Differences in working methods 
The general picture, when assessing differences in delivering placement services, is that 
private job placement agencies appear to use a more labor intense technology. Unem-
ployed at private providers spend more time with their case officer where they get more 
information on vacancies and receive more help in improving their job search strategies. 
They are also more satisfied with their case worker. In addition, they are more frequent 
at attending job fairs. Adolescents, in particular, appear to have a higher job search 
intensity when being at private providers—initiating more contacts with employers, 
applying for more jobs and attending more job interviews—while adolescents at the 
PES spend more time in job training at employers.  
In  Figure 1 we describe the number hours spent in different activities during a 
typical week as a job seeker at either a private job placement agency or the PES. For the 
PES the figure displays values for the control group. For private placement services the 
figure displays IV-estimates of the effects of going to a private provider added to the 
20  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: values for the control group. For all individuals surveyed the number of hours per week 
adds up to 40, representing activities during a normal (8 hour) working day. 
In the first pair of bars we see that unemployed at the private placement agencies 
spent, on average, 1 hour and 40 minutes per week with their case worker, as compared 
to only about 20 minutes for those at the PES; the difference around 1 hour and 20 
minutes being statistically significant. This implies that private placement agencies are 
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Figure 1. Hours spent in different activities last week 
Note: For the public employment services the figure displays values for the control group. For private 
placement services the figure displays IV-estimates of the effects of going to a private provider added to 
the values for the control group. The figure is based on survey information on the number hours spent in 
different activities last week.  
 
Figure 1 also indicates that unemployed at private providers spend more time searching 
for job every week. This includes getting instructions on how to search a job effectively 
(e.g. writing a CV and preparing for interviews). The unemployed at private providers 
spend almost 11 hours searching jobs, while those at the PES spend around eight and a 
half hours a week searching for jobs. Another striking difference is that the PES uses 
job training at employers and internships to a larger extent. While these differences in 
weekly hours spent on searching jobs, and in job training, are suggestive they do not 
reach statistical significance. What is notable in Figure 1  though is that all unem-
IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services:  21 ployed—both at private providers and at the PES—devote most of their time to 
something else; i.e. activities not related to finding a job. 
As seen in Figure 1 unemployed at private providers spent substantially more time 
with their case officer every week. The results in Table 5 corroborate this finding. When 
we ask if the unemployed met their case worker last week, we find that those at a 
private provider had a 48 percentage point higher probability of meeting the case 
worker.. This high interaction with the case worker is present for all three target groups 
included in the experiment. As only 35 percent of the unemployed at the PES on 
average meets with their case worker in a given week; this difference amount to an 
increase of 140 percent. An important issue for the question of the efficiency of private 
job placement agencies is the content and quality of these meetings. Columns 2 and 3 
show that such meetings allegedly helps unemployed at private providers to improve 
their job search strategy and provide them with information with available vacancies. 
This is particularly true for immigrants; a group with potentially weaker connection to 
norms and networks on the Swedish labor market.  
Table 5. Effects of private placement services on contacts with case worker 
 
In contact with case 
worker last week 
 
Case worker helped to 
improve job search 
Case worker provided 
information of 
vacancies 
Sufficient help from 
case workers to find a 
job 






(0.059) (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.061) 






(0.146) (0.084)  (0.094)  (0.154) 






(0.095) (0.068)  (0.079)  (0.099) 






(0.088) (0.052)  (0.066)  (0.091) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). Each cell show the effect from a separate regression, with different 
outcomes across columns and different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for 
each sub experiment and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, 
*/
**/
*** indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 
10/5/1 percent level of confidence. 
 
Unemployed at private providers are also much more satisfied with the service 
received, as seen in column 4 of Table 5. On average, the share that says that they have 
22  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: received sufficient help to find a job is 0.34 higher; which amounts to an increase of 82 
percent. It is in particular disabled, a group that is possibly furthest away from the labor 
market, who state that they have receive sufficient help. , 
Figure 1 suggests that unemployed at private job placement agencies spend less time, 
during a normal week, on job training or internships than the unemployed at the PES. In 
Table 6 this is supported by survey questions asking on job search activities during the 
last month. However, the lower probability of participating in job training for those at 
the private providers emanates entirely from adolescents. Immigrants and disabled are 
not less likely to attend job training. One potential explanation for this result is that the 
PES have positive experience from such activities for adolescents, and therefore have 
specific programs, or other types of working methods, for adolescents geared at 
providing job training.  
Rather than using job training, as a way for unemployed to interact with employers 
and demonstrate their skills, private providers use activities like job fairs and job 
markets. Table 6 shows that immigrants and disabled at private job placement agencies 
are much more likely to attend such events. It is notable, though, that adolescents at 
private providers did not visit job fairs more often than those at the PES. 
Consistent with Figure 1, we also find that unemployed at private providers were 
more frequent in participating in various types of job search training. For example, this 
can be workshops where the unemployed receives instructions on writing application 
letters or are subjected to mock job interviews. The average difference of 36 percentage 
points is large, (47 percent), and effects are present for all subgroups. 
Table 6. Effects of private placement services on job search activities the last 30 days 
Job search training  Job training  Job fair 
Panel A: All 
0.356
*** -0.046  0.103
** 
(0.054) (0.038) (0.047) 
Panel B: Disabled 
0.551
*** 0.041  0.169
* 
(0.127) (0.086) (0.102) 




(0.090) (0.056) (0.085) 




(0.081) (0.061) (0.068) 
IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services:  23 Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). Each cell show the effect from a separate regression, with different 
outcomes across columns and different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for 
each sub experiment and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, 
*/
**/
*** indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 
10/5/1 percent level of confidence. 
 
While unemployed at private providers have a more frequent interaction with their 
case worker—where the emphasis is on improving job search techniques and creating 
contact surfaces with employers—we also look at whether this resulted in a higher job 
search intensity. When we ask about job search intensity during the previous month, 
Table 7, we find that being exposed to the working methods of private provider may 
cause adolescents to become more motivated in their job search. In particular, 
adolescents at private job placement agencies initiated more contacts with prospective 
employers, applied for more jobs, and were called to more interviews, than had they 
been treated at the PES. This effect is however only present for adolescents; We find no 
strong evidence that immigrants or the disabled at private providers applied for more 
jobs or initiated more contacts with prospective employer, as effects are not statistically 
significant. The point estimates, though, suggests that also immigrants and disabled may 
have been more active in initiating contacts with employers. 
Table 7. Effects of private placement services on job search intensity the last 30 days 
Number of self initiated 
contacts with employers 
Number of jobs 
applied 
Number of unannounced 
job applied 
Number of jobs 
interviews 
Panel A: All 
1.625
** 2.083  0.738  0.535
*** 
(0.689) (1.293) (0.704)  (0.176) 
Panel B: Disabled 
1.561 0.119 0.963  0.610 
(1.755) (2.989) (1.383)  (0.439) 
Panel C: Immigrants 
0.817 0.329  -0.258  -0.109 
(0.901) (2.317) (1.163)  (0.352) 
Panel D: Adolescents 
2.340
* 4.386
** 1.433  0.982
*** 
(1.198) (2.052) (1.088)  (0.249) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). Each cell show the effect from a separate regression, with different 
outcomes across columns and different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for 
each sub experiment and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, 
*/
**/
*** indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 
10/5/1 percent level of confidence. 
24  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: 4.2  Effects on labour market outcomes 
Private job placement agencies rely in part on different working methods than the PES; 
as private providers have a stronger emphasis on improving job search technology, 
trying motivating job seekers to search more intensively. The crucial question is 
whether private providers also improve the labor market prospects of unemployed 
relative to the PES. There are essentially two margins that can be affected. Private 
providers may influence both the chances of finding a job—reducing the time to 
employment—and how well the job fits the person’s skill profile, i.e. the quality of the 
match. Since the private contractors are remunerated largely based on successful 
placements, a potential worry is that they may save effort by placing unemployed at 
jobs where the matching quality is lower.  
We will assess effects both on the prospects of finding a job and on three proxy 
measures of matching quality; hours worked; job satisfaction, and monthly wage 
earnings. Our results do not indicate any overall effect of private employment services 
on the prospects of finding a job. There are however important heterogeneities across 
the target groups; in particular, immigrants at private providers worked more during the 
first six first months after randomization. When using wage earnings as a broader 
measure of labor market prospects—capturing employment as well as hours worked and 
matching quality—we find that immigrants at private providers have higher earnings up 
to 12 months after randomization. We also find some support for private providers 
having a negative effect on earnings and hours worked for adolescents. 
Employment 
In Table 8 we present effects of receiving job placement services from private providers 
on employment. As an indicator of employment status we use the incidence of having 
earnings. Specifically, we use taxation data from employers with monthly information 
on whether the individual has received income. We estimate the employment effect at 
different points in time after randomization. To be more exact, we measure the effect as 
the number of months with earnings exceeding SEK 5,000 within 3/6/9/12 months after 
randomization. The first column shows the effect of private job placement on 
employment prospects 1 to 3 months after randomization; on average unemployed at 
private provides have worked 0.075 months more during the three first months after 
IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services:  25 randomization, than had they been at the PES. This effect is not significant, and neither 
are the effects for any of the subgroups. Three months may be too early to expect any 
employment effect. 
The second column displays employment effects during the first six months after 
randomization, which was the longest period an unemployed under treatment could 
spend at a private provider (3 months for adolescents). The results show that the average 
difference between public and private employment services is small; unemployed at a 
private job placement agency had on average worked 0.14 months more during the six 
first months, but this effect is not statistically significant. However, these small average 
effects hide interesting differences across subgroups. While the point estimate for 
adolescents is negative, the effect is in fact positive and marginally significant for 
immigrants. Immigrants at private providers worked 0.7 months more the first half year 
after randomization. This pattern is similar also nine months after randomization. There 
is still an indication that adolescents at private providers are doing worse, and the effect 
for immigrants is still large and positive but does no longer reach statistical significance 
(p=0.103). In the longer run, up to a year after randomization, any differences in 
employment effects across public and private employment services tend to decline in 
size.  
Table 8. Employment effects of private placement services summed over different 









Panel A: All 
0.0751 0.144  0.130 0.0665 
(0.117) (0.222) (0.332) (0.460) 
Panel B: Disabled 
0.314  0.583  0.761  0.651 
(0.223) (0.429) (0.651) (0.880) 
Panel C: Immigrants 
0.295 0.695* 0.900  0.882 
(0.194) (0.369) (0.553) (0.744) 
Panel D: Adolescents 
-0.139 -0.320 -0.520 -0.718 
(0.180) (0.343) (0.510) (0.739) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). The outcome variable is the number of months with positive wage earnings. 
Each cell show the effect from a separate regression, with different outcomes across columns and 
different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for each sub experiment and controls 




indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent level of confidence. 
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In order to be more elaborate on how employment effects evolve over time, and whether 
there are any important differences in patterns across the target groups, we presents also 
detailed results graphically. In Figure 2 we display the employment effect—month-by-
month—of obtaining job placement services at a private provider instead of the PES. 
Effects are displayed for the period 1 month before randomization until 13 months after 
the randomization, where month 0 represents the month of the randomization. The solid 
line represents the probability of finding a job in a specific month, and the dotted lines 
indicate the 95percent confidence interval. Panel A displays the overall employment 
effects of placement services at private providers; we see here that effects are small and 
insignificant throughout the whole follow-up period 13 months from randomization. 
Panels B-D show the effects for the different target groups separately. For disabled 
we do not find any employment effect from being at a private provider. As seen in Panel 
B, one should, however, be careful in interpreting results for disabled as point estimates 
are positive and substantial in size but fairly imprecisely estimated. 
For immigrants there appears to be a positive employment effect from being at a 
private provider peaking around six months after the randomization; in fact, the estimate 
at month 6 after randomization is significant. Over a longer follow-up period the size of 
the estimated effects declines. The pattern with potentially negative employment effects 
for adolescents is visible in Panel D, where point estimates show a consistent negative 
pattern between the second and the eighth month after randomization. These effects 
never reach statistical significance though. 
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Figure 2. Employment effects of private placement services at different months after 
randomization 
Note: The solid line shows IV-estimates of the month-by-month effect of private job placement services 
(as compared to the public employment services), while the dotted line show the 95 percent confidence 
intervals using robust standard errors. The outcome variable is positive wage earnings. All models include 
fixed effects for each sub experiment and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3.  
 
In the analyses above employment status is defined as having wage earnings 
exceeding 5,000 SEK. As a corroborating support for this information, we have also 
estimated employment effects based on survey information; see Table A3 in the 
Appendix. In the two surveys, respondents where asked about their employment status 
at 1/3 months and at 6/9 months after randomization. Although these estimates are 
insignificant, the point estimates are in line with the results in Figure 2. 
Wage earnings, hours worked and job satisfaction  
It is natural to evaluate the relative effectiveness of public and private employment 
services based on “employment” capturing the extensive margin of labour market 
participation; especially since private providers are remunerated based successful place-
28  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: ments. But to focus on employment as an outcome may also be restrictive in the sense 
and there are many other aspects of the matching between employers and job seekers 
that we think are important. We have therefore estimated effects on wage earnings, 
since we believe that earnings is a broader composite measure of labour market 
participation capturing also the quality of the match; both hours worked and whether the 
individual is at a job where his particular set of skills is more productive, thus 
generating a higher wage. 
In  figure 3 we display the earnings effect—month-by-month—of being under 
treatment from a private job placement agency rather that the PES. The solid lines 
represent the earnings in SEK gained/lost a specific month caused by being at a private 
provider. Similar to the employment effect, Panel A show that the overall earnings 
effect from being at a private provider is negligible; both small in size and insignificant 
up to 13 months after randomization. This is in line with the results on the employment 
effect. 
For disabled (Panel B) we find positive and quite substantial estimates on wage 
earning throughout the intervention period, but none of the effects are statistically 
significant. It is therefore difficult to make any conclusion on the effectiveness of 
private employment services for disabled. 
The earnings effects for immigrants show a positive and increasing pattern 
throughout the intervention period; the pattern is similar to the employment effects, but 
is here even more pronounced. Panel C shows significant effects on wage earnings, for 
immigrant at private job placement agencies, already from the third month after 
randomization, with a peak at the end of the intervention period six months after 
randomization. Over time, however, the positive effect on wage earnings levels out and 
declines. 
Also for adolescents the wage earnings effect resembles the employment effect. In 
Panel D we see that the effects on earnings become strikingly negative five through 
twelve months after randomization. It should be noted that for adolescents the 
intervention with private job placement agencies had only a duration of three months. 
Hence, while at the private provider there are no differences, but after the intervention 
IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services:  29 has ended there may be detrimental effects for adolescents from having been at a private 
provider; in fact, the effect is significant eight months after randomization.  
It is notable that any effect on immigrants and adolescents declines over time; a year 
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Figure 3. Earning effects of private placement services at different months after 
randomization 
Note: The solid line shows IV-estimates of the month-by-month effect of private job placement services 
(as compared to the public employment services), while the dotted line show the 95 percent confidence 
intervals using robust standard errors. All models include fixed effects for each sub experiment and 
controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. 
 
While  figure 3 shows the wage earning effects in specific months as well as 
displaying patterns over time, we would also like to measure the overall effect on 
earnings. We have therefore estimated the sum of wage earnings at different months 
after randomization. 
In Table 9 columns 1 to 4 we estimate the effects of private placement service on 
aggregated wage earnings 3/6/9/12 months after randomization, respectively. In panel A 
(columns 1 to 4) we see small and insignificant overall effects on aggregated earning for 
30  IFAU – Effects of contracting out employment services: all time spans. The effect on aggregated earnings for disabled is much larger—4,000 
SEK after 6 months and almost 13,000 SEK after 12 months—but since the sample size 
is small (only 13 percent of the experiment) estimates are statistically insignificant. 
For immigrants (Panel C), on the other hand, we find positive and statistically 
significant effects on aggregated earnings for all time spans. After three months the 
benefit of being at a private provider, instead of the PES, is 6,800 SEK and after another 
three months the aggregated earnings effect has increased to 15,100 SEK. After twelve 
months, immigrants at a private job placement agency has gained 23,300 SEK 
compared their peers at the PES. Since the average aggregated wage earnings over the 
same time span at the PES is 54,600 SEK, this amount to an 43 percent increase in 
earnings.  
The aggregated earnings effect for adolescents show a different pattern and are 
negative over all time spans from the randomization, but are insignificant. 
The results show that for immigrants there is a positive effect on earnings from being 
at a private provider, in particular in the later phase of the intervention period (3 to 6 
months after randomization). In fact, as long as twelve months after randomization there 
is still a positive effect on aggregated earnings. For adolescents, results instead indicate 
a negative effect on wage earnings from being at a private provider. The estimates 
displayed in figure 3 are negative for all month and is significant 7 months after 
randomization. 
In addition to wage earnings, we try to capture other aspects of matching quality by 
using survey questions on the number of hours worked per week 6/9 months after the 
randomization. Table 9 column 5 shows that there is a small overall reduction in the 
number of weekly hours worked when being at a private provider, but this reduction is 
not statistically significant. What is interesting though is that the estimated effect for 
immigrants is substantial while still being insignificant; the point estimate indicates that 
immigrants at a private provider works 4.2 hours more per week. This strengthens the 
hypothesis that the increase in aggregated earnings may, at least partially, be due to 
more hours worked. For adolescents we find a negative and significant effect, indicating 
that adolescents at private providers work 5 hours less per week. This also indicates that 
the negative earnings pattern may partly be due to effects on the intensive margin. 
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to assess a more qualitative measure of matching quality; namely job satisfaction. We 
do not find any effect on job satisfaction from having been at a private job placement 
agency; neither an overall effect nor effects for the different subgroups. 
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Table 9. Effects of private placement services on aggregated earning at different months after randomization, hours worked and job 
satisfaction  
Aggregated earnings  
3 months after 
randomization 
Aggregated earnings  
6 months after 
randomization 
Aggregated earnings  
9 months after 
randomization 
Aggregated earnings  
12 months after 
randomization 
Hours worked 6/9 
months after 
randomization 
Job satisfaction 6/9 
months after 
randomization 
Panel A: All 
1,536 3,012 2,349 912  -1.896  -0.036 
(1,725) (3,510) (5,373) (7,524) (1.897) (0.055) 
Panel B: Disabled 
1,707 4,068 10,305  12,936  -2.350  -0.114 
(3,060) (6,348) (9,900) (13,548)  (3.605) (0.109) 





* 4.251  0.137 
(3,198) (6,402) (9,864) (13,332)  (3.233) (0.091) 
Panel D: Adolescents 
-1,741 -5,567 -11,628  -17,412  -5.061
*  -0.103 
(2,568) (5,251) (7,982) (11,657)  (2.932) (0.085) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the public employment services). Each cell show the 
effect from a separate regression, with different outcomes across columns and different (sub)samples across lines. The outcome variable is indicated in the 
column heading. All models include fixed effects for each sub experiment and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, 
*/
**/
*** indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent level of confidence. 
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Wellbeing 
From the individuals perspective we are not only interested in whether an individual has 
a job; how many hours he works, or if he earns sufficient. These aspects of the working 
life can more be seen as intermediate measures. On a more general level, what we are 
interested in is whether an intervention affects a person’s wellbeing. From this per-
spective we can view a person’s self-perceived wellbeing as a broader measure of 
matching quality. 
For this purpose we have asked a number of questions on individuals’ self-perceived 
life situation 6/9 months after randomization; that is, they were surveyed three months 
after the end of the intervention period. Table 10 shows the effects on the (self-
perceived) life situation from being at a private provider instead of the PES, where 
positive effects indicate a better life situation. We do not find any overall effects on the 
life quality measures. However, we do find that disabled who were at private providers 
are feeling less happy; feeling less active; feeling they have had a less interesting day, 
three months after the end of the trial period at private providers. It is difficult to know 
how to understand these effects, but one potential interpretation is that these individuals 
put great hope in that the private providers would be able to help them out of 
unemployment. When this did not materialize they were disappointed and despaired. 
Table 10. Effects of private placement services on individuals’ life situation 
Feeling happy and in a 
good mood (1-6) 
Feeling active and full 
of energy (1-6) 
My day has been 
interesting (1-6) 
Overall life satisfaction 
(1-10) 
Panel A: All 
-0.130 -0.0506  -0.0691  -0.0613 
(0.151) (0.157) (0.167) (0.289) 
Panel B: Disabled 
-0.535* -0.697**  -1.014***  -0.871 
(0.320) (0.343) (0.347) (0.627) 
Panel C: Immigrants 
-0.126 0.170 0.206 0.191 
(0.211) (0.222) (0.244) (0.394) 
Panel D: Adolescents 
-0.126 0.170 0.206 0.191 
(0.211) (0.222) (0.244) (0.394) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). All outcome variables are measured on a scale where higher values indicate 
a better life situation. Each cell show the effect from a separate regression, with different outcomes across 
columns and different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for each sub experiment 
and controls for background characteristics described in Table 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, 
*/
**/
*** indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10/5/1 percent 
level of confidence. 
5 Conclusions 
When a government should provide services in-house and when it should contract out 
provision is a central policy question. In this paper we have assessed the case for 
contracting out employment services to private job placement agencies in Sweden. The 
setting exhibits many of the ex-ante arguments for when the scope for private provision 
is likely to be large, as suggested by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) 
and Hart (1995). More specifically, in this setting the service is well defined and 
contracts are highly incentivized; the extent of non-contractible quality is limited; there 
is a substantial competition for contracts; current performance may have consequences 
for future procurement; and there is a substantial capacity for innovation. 
In order to identify the effects of private employment services we have generated 
experimental variation where unemployed adolescents, disabled, and immigrants were 
randomly given an opportunity to switch from the PES to a private job placement 
agency during the intervention period. Over 2,400 unemployed individuals were 
randomly allocated into an experimental group, of whom about a quarter decided to 
switch to a private provider. Almost 2,400 individuals were randomly assigned to a 
control group, who did not get the opporutnity to switch providers. 
The results indicate that private job placement agencies innovate the business in the 
sense that they use a more labor intense technology when providing employment 
services; unemployed at private providers meet their case worker one-and-a-half time as 
often. They also felt that they received more help in improving their job search 
strategies and more help in finding vacancies, than those at the PES. In general, 
unemployed at private placement agencies were more satisfied with their case worker. 
This more frequent interaction with the case worker resulted in a higher job search 
intensity for adolescents at a private provider; they initiated more contacts with 
prospective employers, applied for more jobs, and were called to more interviews, than 
had they been at the PES. Adolescents at the PES, on the other hand, spent more time in 
job training at employers and internships. Thus, the higher job search intensity for 
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unemployed youths at private providers may in part be driven by lower job search effort 
among program participants at PES (locking-in effects). 
This increased interaction with case workers did not improve the overall chances of 
finding a job for unemployed at private placement agencies. There are however 
important heterogeneities; immigrants at private providers had a higher chance of 
finding employment and had higher earnings. We also find some support for private 
providers having a negative effect on earnings and hours worked for adolescents; in 
particularly after the end of the intervention period. 
The positive effects of private placement services for immigrants is particularly large 
at the end of the intervention period (six first months after randomization) when 
contractors had strong incentives to find employment for the job seeker in order to 
obtain full payments. This may indicate that the marginal product of effort, from the 
placement agencies perspective, was highest for this group. Immigrants may have high 
employment potential, but may be lacking necessary contacts and network on the 
Swedish labor market. In particular, such contacts may be exhausted when being 
unemployed. Since private providers work actively with helping job seekers to initiate 
contacts with employers, they may be particularly productive for immigrants. 
The potentially negative effects on employment and wage earnings, for adolescents 
at private placement agencies, comes despite the fact that they applied for more jobs and 
attended more job interviews. The way we can reconcile this apparent paradox, is that 
adolescents at the PES recieved more job training and had more internships, and that 
these, in turn, may have generated the necessary interaction with employers to secure 
employment. 
The general conclusion from our finding is that one size does not fit all. Even if the 
ex-ante case for contracting out employment services in the present setting is strong we 
do not find any overall effect of effectiveness, but a substantial heterogeneity. This 
suggests that one has to be careful when deciding on which services to produce in-house 
and which to contract out. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of outcome variables 
Outcome variables  Experimenal group  Control group  Number of observations 
Aggregated income 1-3 months (SEK)  10552  9740  4804 
Aggregated income 1-6 months (SEK)  24992  23336  4804 
Aggregated income 1-9 months (SEK)  42404  40505  4804 
Aggregated income 1-12 months (SEK)  60850  58739  4452 
Number of months employed 1-3 months  0.720  0.677  4804 
Number of months employed 1-6 months  1.633  1.551  4804 
Number of months employed 1-9 months  2.755  2.659  4804 
Number of months employed 1-12 months  3.948  3.848  4452 
Employment 1/3 months after randomization  0.318  0.306  2838 
Employment 6/9 months after randomization  0.411  0.410  3415 
Hours worked 6/9 months after randomization  12.843  13.112  3408 
Job satisfaction 6/9 months after randomization  0.358  0.361  3347 
In contact with case worker last week  0.544  0.345  1680 
Case worker helped me to improve my job search  0.191  0.050  1680 
Case worker provided information of vacancies  0.222  0.109  1680 
Sufficient help from case workers to find a job  0.555  0.410  1553 
Job search training the last 30 days   0.379  0.242  1680 
Job training the last the 30 days  0.094  0.122  1680 
Job fair the last 30 days  0.205  0.162  1678 
Number of self initiated contacts with employers the last 30 days  3.692  2.979  1593 
Number of jobs applied for the last 30 days  8.736  7.724  1621 
Number of unannounced jobs applied for the last 30 days  3.284  2.914  1589 
Number of job interviews in the last 30 days  0.770  0.544  1621 
Feeling happy and in a good mood (1-6)  2.881  2.861  3275 
Feeling active and full of energy (1-6)  2.943  2.960  3257 
My day have been interesting (1-6)  3.127  3.126  3254 
Overall life satisfaction (1-10)  6.149  6.111  3173 
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Table A2. Employment effects of private placement services 6/9 months after 
randomization OLS, reduced form and IV 
 OLS  First  stage  Reduced  form  IV 
  Panel A: No individual controls 
Private employment service  0.0457***      -0.0165 
 (0.0168)      (0.0563) 
Experimental group    0.277***  -0.00499   
   (0.0200)  (0.0139)   
  Panel B: Individual controls 
Private employment service  0.0431**      -0.0236 
 (0.0188)      (0.0553) 
Experimental group    0.276***  -0.00711   
   (0.0201)  (0.0120)   
Male 0.0341*  -0.0231**  0.0326*  0.0319* 
 (0.0185)  (0.0112)  (0.0187)  (0.0170) 
Age -0.00321**  0.00180*  -0.00318**  -0.00315** 
 (0.00147)  (0.000954)  (0.00146)  (0.00127) 
Unemployed, months  -0.00572**  0.00273*  -0.00564**  -0.00560* 
 (0.00259)  (0.00148)  (0.00260)  (0.00327) 
Education upper sec.  0.107***  0.0156  0.108***  0.109*** 
 (0.0200)  (0.0130)  (0.0200)  (0.0204) 
Education University  0.188***  0.0225  0.190***  0.191*** 
 (0.0281)  (0.0248)  (0.0288)  (0.0284) 
Pre-study income  0.00164  0.000386  0.00172  0.00172 
 (0.00149)  (0.00120)  (0.00148)  (0.00157) 
Pre-study income>0  0.0658***  -0.00365  0.0650***  0.0648*** 
 (0.0198)  (0.0108)  (0.0196)  (0.0206) 
Non-Nordic citizen  -0.0933***  -0.000926  -0.0936***  -0.0941*** 
 (0.0259)  (0.0150)  (0.0260)  (0.0267) 
Unemployment insurance  0.0621***  -0.00988  0.0614***  0.0609*** 
 (0.0194)  (0.0142)  (0.0197)  (0.0218) 
Searching full time empl.  -0.0750  0.0178  -0.0743  -0.0740* 
 (0.0514)  (0.0250)  (0.0513)  (0.0448) 
Extended search area  0.0224  -0.00587  0.0230  0.0232 
 (0.0154)  (0.0111)  (0.0152)  (0.0177) 
Long term unemployed  -0.0542  -0.00724  -0.0541  -0.0539* 
 (0.0392)  (0.0145)  (0.0393)  (0.0322) 
Observations 3415  4804  3415  3415 
# Groups  50  51  50  50 
Note: All models include an intercept and fixed effects of region×target group×experimental wave. 
  
 







Panel A: All 
0.014 -0.024 
(0.057) (0.055) 
Panel B: Disabled 
0.056 -0.027 
(0.122) (0.108) 
Panel C: Immigrants 
-0.008 0.110 
(0.089) (0.093) 
Panel D: Adolescents 
0.006 -0.092 
(0.087) (0.085) 
Note: The table shows the IV-estimates of the effect of private job placement services (as compared to the 
public employment services). Each cell show the effect from a different regression, with different 
outcomes across columns and different (sub)samples across lines. All models include fixed effects for 




*** significant at10/5/1 percent. 
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